Implicit cost allocation and bidding for contracts by Cohen, S.I.

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
' CD
<r
in
CD to
r-
<r&
Cvi
«-*
»E o
o
z
o

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 89-1558
Implicit Cost Allocation
and Bidding for Contracts
THE LIBRARY OF THE
MAY 3 i 1989
UN. - ..Ko.i 1 Oh ILLIIMUIS
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Susan I. Cohen
Martin Loeb
WORKING PAPER SERIES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS
NO. 26
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/implicitcostallo1558cohe
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 89-1558
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign
May 1989
WORKING PAPER SERIES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS NO. 26
Implicit Cost Alloction and Bidding for Contracts
Susan I. Cohen, Associate Professor
Department of Business Administration
Martin Loeb
University of Maryland
^Associate Professor, College of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of Illinois, Champaign, II 61820.
**Associate Professor, College of Business and Management, University of
Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.
The authors wish to thank Larry Gordon for helpful discussions. All
errors, of course, remain our own.

ABSTRACT
The question of how, or even whether, indirect costs should be
allocated for pricing decisions has been controversial and unresolved.
This paper takes a step toward answering this question by examining the
special case of a firm that must incur incremental fixed costs to
complete any or all of the several projects for which it is submitting
simultaneous bids. An independent private-values bidding model is
employed to endogenously determine an optimal cost allocation; we term
such a cost allocation "implicit." The optimal implicit fixed cost
allocation is shown to fully allocate fixed costs ex ante, although the
fixed costs may be under, over, or exactly allocated ex post.

I . Introduction
A flourishing line of recent research in management accounting has
focused on explaining the use of cost allocations as part of a firm's
internal control system. This literature began in earnest with Zimmerman
[1979] , and was a reaction to earlier studies that either advocated
abandoning cost allocations or adopting complicated new cost allocation
methods . ^
The controversy surrounding the allocation of fixed costs for use in
pricing goods or services in external markets has an even longer history,
and has been associated with the full cost versus marginal cost or
absorption costing versus variable cost debate. Giving a motivation
that was a precursor to one given by Zimmerman [1979] for allocating
fixed costs for internal control, Devine [1950] suggests that fixed costs
proxy for some unobservable opportunity costs that are not captured in
variable costs alone. Thus, the widespread use of full costs in pricing
(Gordon et al., 1981; Govindarajan and Anthony, 1983) may be partially
reconciled with economists prescriptions for pricing so as to equate
marginal revenue with marginal cost. More recently, Dickhaut and Lere
[1983] and Lere [1986] present more formal analyses to explain the use of
allocated fixed costs for pricing. In Dickhaut and Lere [1983], the use
of absorption costs for pricing results from systematic measurement error
in the accounting system. In Lere [1986], bounded rationality and costly
information provide the rationale for using allocated fixed costs in
• • 4pricing.
In this paper we use a bidding model to help explain the fact that
allocations of fixed costs are used in pricing decisions. Considered is
a firm preparing bids for a number of projects. We assume that if the
firm wins one or more of these projects, it will have to incur F dollars
of additional fixed costs for the purchase of specialized equipment or
personnel training. We assume that this equipment or training will have
no value to the firm other than for the projects for which the firm is
now bidding. While there is general agreement that incremental fixed
costs are relevant for pricing decisions (e.g., Horngren and Foster 1987,
p. 304), the question of how such a joint incremental cost should be
allocated for pricing has not been answered. Indeed, the prevailing view
appears to be that there is no optimal method of allocating the fixed
costs - the choice among methods is arbitrary. To our knowledge, our
model is the first in which a cost allocation arises endogenously in a
firm's pricing (bidding) decision. We show that the firm's optimal
implicit cost allocation is tidy in an ex ante sense, but not in an ex
post sense.
Allocation in our model is driven by the incremental nature of the
fixed costs combined with the stochastic nature of demand. This is in
contrast to the motivations for allocating fixed costs (measurement error
and bounded rationality) given in Dickhaut and Lere [1983] and Lere
[1986]. In our model, optimal bids include an allocation of fixed
(capacity) costs, even though there is a likelihood that there will be
excess capacity. Although new projects do not impose externalities on
other new projects, the additional capacity cost, F, that the group of
possible new projects taken together impose on existing projects may be
viewed as a type of congestion cost. Thus, the motivation for allocating
fixed costs in our model is similar to that provided by Banker et al
.
[1988], Devine [1950], Miller and Buckman [1987] and Zimmerman [1979].
We examine the optimal pricing behavior of a risk-neutral firm
participating in a number of simultaneous auctions in which competitors
submit sealed bids, and in which each project is awarded to the firm
submitting the lowest bid in that auction. In the terminology of the
auction literature (Englebrecht-Wiggins , 1980; McAfee and McMillan, 1987)
the firm participates in a number of sealed-bid first-price auctions. In
our model a firm does not face the same bidders in each of the auctions
in which it participates; some of the bidders may be the same across
auctions, but not all. A firm, therefore may win any number (not just
none or all) of the projects for which it submits bids.
In the next section, we derive the optimal bidding policy of firms.
The firm's optimal bid for a project is shown to be composed of the
firm's direct costs of the project plus an implicit allocation of fixed
costs plus a bidding competition term; this latter term represents the
rents earned by the firm as a result of its private information about
costs. We also show that the implicit cost allocation is exact in an ex
ante sense, and we examine conditions under which ex post allocated costs
are less than, equal to, or greater than total fixed costs. A brief
summary appears in section three.
II. The Firm's Bidding Problem
Consider the case of a risk-neutral firm preparing to submit
simultaneous sealed bids for a number of projects. Each project is to be
awarded to the lowest bidder. For each project that the firm wins, the
firm will incur some direct costs associated with the specific project.
In addition to the direct costs of the projects won, the firm will incur
incremental fixed costs of F, if it wins any of the projects. The
incremental fixed costs may arise from the purchase of specialized
equipment or specialized training of personnel that only is useful for
the projects for which the firm is now bidding. How should such
incremental fixed costs be incorporated into the firm's bids? In order
to address this question, we use an independent-private -values model
(Milgrom and Weber [1982]) in which bidders differ only with respect to a
single parameter representing an independent draw from a known
probability distribution. This parameter will reflect the production
efficiency of the firms.
In the standard independent-private-values models, each firm
participates in only one auction, and the optimal bid is studied by
examining the symmetric equilibrium. In our model, firms participate in
a number of auctions, thus it is necessary to make additional assumptions
in order to study optimal bids using the symmetric equilibrium. Suppose
there are N potential risk-neutral bidders and Jq projects to be awarded.
We assume that there are n < N bidders in each auction, that each bidder
participates in J < Jq auctions, and the set of J auctions in which the
firm participates is exogenously determined and known to the firm.
'
Furthermore, we suppose that each of the N firms knows the parameters N,
n, Jq, and J, and that each firm believes that the n-1 other firms
competing with the firm in any one auction are randomly chosen from the
remaining N-1 firms.
In addition to the incremental fixed cost F incurred if a bidder
wins at least one project, bidder i will incur direct costs of Cj + v^,
if the firm wins project j , where C,- is an idiosyncratic cost associated
the project known by all the firms, and v^ is an idiosyncratic cost
parameter known only by firm i. All other firms k^i know that v^
represents an independent draw from the distribution G(v) , where
v e [v",v+ ] Thus, v^ is the single efficiency or cost parameter
differentiating firms.
All the firms face the identical problem of selecting J bids given a
value of their cost parameter, V. We therefore may focus on a generic
bidding firm. We suppose without loss of generality, that the generic
firm submits bids for project 1,2,..., J. Let b-n = B-j(V^) be firm i's
symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. Thus firm i's optimal bid
is bj j_ - Bj(V^) for project j, given that all other firms k ^ i bid bj^ =
Bj (V^) if they participate in the j th auction, for j = 1,2 J.
The probability that firm i wins auction j is just the probability
that bj £ < bjk for all k / i. Since we are talking about symmetric Nash
equilibrium strategies, we may now drop the subscript i that refers to
the firm. Formally the probability that a firm wins auction j can be
written as:
[1 - G(Bj
- 1 (b
j ))]
n - 1
. (1)
For ease of exposition, we define H(v;n) [1 - G(v)] n . If the firm
wins the auction (project) its profits gross of the fixed costs will be
equal to bj - ca - v. Since the firm incurs the fixed cost F only if it
wins at least one of the projects, we can write the firm's ex ante
expected profits as:
J
P(v,b! bj) = S H(Bj- 1 (bj );n)[bj - Cj - v]
J
n - HCBj-^bj)))}. (2)
where the expression in curly brackets multiplying F is the firm's
probability of winning at least one project.
From the symmetry of the J auctions in which each bidder
participates, we know that in equilibrium B-j (v) - c-j will be independent
of j . This results from the fact that there are n bidders in each of the
auctions and c-j is the only parameter idiosyncratic to auction j . Define
B(v) B-j (v) -c-j. In equilibrium we can write expected profits as
P (v) , where
J
P*(v) - S H(v;n)[B
i
(v) - C4 - v] - F{1 - (1 - H(v;n)) J ). (3)
J-l
- JH(v;n)[B(v) - v] - F{1 - (1 - H(v;n)) J }
From the envelope theorem, we know that in equilibrium the derivative of
P (v) with respect to v is just the partial derivative of P(v;b]_ , . . . ,b-j
)
with respect to v evaluated at bj - B-j (v) for all j. Thus, we have:
P*'(v) - -JH(v;n). (4)
Since P (v+ ) - in equilibrium, expected profits are then:
r +v
P*(v) -P* (s)ds
(5)
JH(s;n)ds
The synunetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategies must therefore
satisfy, using (3), (5) and the definition of B(v)
:
Bj (v) - cj = v +
P*(v)
JH(v;n)
{1 - (1 - H(v;n)) J }
+ F
JH(v;n)
= v +
H(v;n)
H(s;n)ds + F
{1 - (1 - H(v;n)) J }
JH(v;n)
(6)
Hence, the firm bids its direct costs of the project, c-; + v, plus a
positive term that represents a payment to induce bidding competition,
plus an allocated portion of fixed costs (as the coefficient of F is less
than one) The bidding competition term is generally interpreted as the
rents that the bidders earn as a result of their private information
about v.
It is straightforward that B-; (v) is increasing in v for all j ,
since costs are increasing in v and the auction form assumes that lower
bids have a higher probability of winning. Thus, each auction is won by
the most efficient (least cost) bidder participating in that auction.
In equilibrium, expected profits are decreasing in v (from equation
(4)): as costs increase, the bidder expects to earn lower profits. We
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also see from (5) that expected ex ante profits do not depend on fixed
costs F; profits are the total informational rents that can be captured
by the bidder. Thus, we can conclude that the bidder expects to recoup
all of fixed costs via the bids ex ante.
The term multiplying F in equation (6) represents the implicit cost
allocation share, i.e. the fraction of fixed costs that are allocated to
a particular project. This fraction is strictly decreasing in H, the
probability of winning a particular project. Since H is decreasing in
both n (the number of bidders in an auction) and v, we have that the
fraction is strictly increasing in v and n. When the probability of
winning a particular project decreases, the expected number of projects
won also decreases. The bidder recoups a larger fraction of fixed costs
from each project, since the bidder expects to have a smaller number of
projects from which to recoup fixed costs. In particular, we have:
{1 - (1 - H(v+ ;n)) J )
F 1
JH(v+ ;n)
and (7)
{1 - (1 - H(V;n)) J } 1
F
JH(v';n) J
The bidder with the highest possible costs (v+ ) allocates all of fixed
costs to each of the projects since the bidder expects to win no
projects. The bidder with the lowest possible costs (v~) allocates 1/J
to each project since the bidder expects to win all of the projects, and
in this way will exactly recoup fixed costs.
Even though ex ante fixed costs are fully allocated, ex post fixed
costs may be under, exactly or over allocated, depending on how many
auctions are actually won. If the bidder wins an average number of
projects, which is just JH(v;n), the ex post costs recouped from the bids
are just:
F{1 - (1 - H(v;n)) J ). (8)
The term in curly brackets in (8) represents the ex ante probability that
the firm will win at least one project. Hence, expression (8) also
represents the firm's expected expenditures for fixed costs. Thus, a
bidder winning an average number of projects given v (JH(v;n)) will
indeed exactly allocate fixed costs ex ante. However, if the bidder wins
an average number of projects, the firm's ex post incremental fixed costs
will be F which is strictly larger than the expression in (8) . Therefore
when the bidder wins an average number of projects given v, the bidder
will under allocate fixed costs ex post.
In general, the total amount of fixed costs recouped by the bidder,
where X is the number of projects won, equals:
{1 - (1 - H(v;n)) J }
FX . (9)
JH(v;n)
Since costs are not fully recouped when the number of projects actually
won equals E[X], we know that there exists an X(v;n) > E[X] such that for
all x greater than (less than) (equal to) X(v;n) the bidder recoups more
than (less than) (exactly) fixed costs ex post.
Even though the bidder expects to fully recoup all fixed costs ex
10
ante, the bidder must win a larger than "average" number of projects to
fully recoup fixed costs ex post.
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III. Summary
We have examined the situation in which a firm participates in a
number of simultaneous auctions for projects and faces indirect costs
that are incremental and fixed. In our model, the symmetric Nash
equilibrium bid consists of direct costs plus a bidding competition term
plus a term representing an implicit allocation of the incremental fixed
costs. The cost allocation that is implicit in the firm's bids was shown
to fully allocate the incremental fixed costs in an ex ante sense.
Although the ex ante allocation results in an exact allocation of fixed
costs, the incremental fixed costs may be under allocated, exactly
allocated, or over allocated ex post. Although the value of allocating
indirect costs for pricing has been debated for some time, we know of no
other model in which an allocation of indirect costs arises endogenously
in the determination of a firm's optimal prices.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Biddle and Steinberg [1984] for a review of this literature. Some
of the more recent papers that seek to provide a rationale for cost
allocations include Baiman and Noel [1985], Balachandran et. al . [1987],
Cohen and Loeb [1988], Magee [1988], Miller and Buckman [1987], and Suh
[1987,1988]
.
2. This debate has carried over to normative prescriptions in popular
accounting texts. For example, Anthony and Reece [1979, p. 547] state
that "...each product should bear a fair share of the total cost of the
business," while Horngren and Foster [1987, p. 306] have a section in
their pricing chapter entitle "Superiority of the contribution approach."
3. Recent papers by Banker et. al . [1988] and Miller and Buckman [1987],
in which there is a stochastic demand for manufacturing facilities
provide additional support for allocating fixed costs as a means of
dealing with difficult to observe congestion costs.
4. Hilton et. al . [1988], using a laboratory experiment, find partial
support for the theory proposed by Lere [1986].
5. This view of cost allocations as arbitrary is largely due to the
influential monographs of Thomas [1969,1974].
6. The term "tidy", as used by Demski [1981], indicates that the sum of
allocated costs exactly equals the costs to be allocated.
7. Although not all combinations of the parameters N, Jq, n and J are
feasible, it is easy to find combinations that are feasible. Such a
determination is outside of the scope of the present paper.
8. Note that v" and v may be minus and plus infinity, respectively.
9. The distribution of X, the number of projects won, is binomial with
parameters J and H(v;n). Since E[X] - JH(v;n), this result is immediate.
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